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The role of design history in museums devoted to the history 
of technics and technology is surely to ensure that the nar-
ratives employed describe the wide range of drivers behind 
the development of technological artefacts in an unbiased 
way, and ideally, to communicate as accurately as possible 
the different ways in which technology has been presented 
to and received by the public. Using the example of the elec-
tronic computer, this paper aims to demonstrate the prob-
lematic breadth of the different narrative themes necessary 
to achieve such communication. 
This paper concentrates on three of the most common 
types of narrative employed in museums of technology: 
the interrelated narratives of individual endeavour, national 
agendas, and corporate competition. Following these ‘tradi-
tional’ narratives is a description and examples of a wider, 
contextual discourse in which technology has been present-
ed in equal parts as heralding both a utopian and a dystopian 
future for mankind.  
It is argued that in order to present a thorough and mean-
ingful history of technological objects, these different narra-
tives need to be addressed in a balanced and nuanced way. 
Introduction
As academic research into the history of the electronic computer has grown and 
developed over recent years, the complexity of the object and the wide variety of 
factors that have effected its increasing dominance in our everyday lives have 
come under scrutiny. As a result, numerous ‘histories’ of the object have been 
constructed from a variety of perspectives, including technologically determinis-
tic accounts of continual, unstoppable ‘progress’; socio-economic accounts of cor-
porate growth and decline; political accounts of world war and cold war subterfuge 
employing computers, and social constructionist texts arguing that computer 
developments have followed the public expectations fostered through mainstream 
futurism. While this spread of narrative lenses is most welcome in the world of 
academic literature, it presents a significant problem in the context of the muse-
um, where the space and time to present complex narratives is limited.
Possibly because of this significant limitation, there is, perhaps, a tendency 
of computer museums to overstate the sometimes simplistic technologically 
deterministic aspects of computer development and underplay the more com-
plex and nuanced economic, political and social construction aspects.
While the range of narratives applicable to the development of computing 
technology is wide, the most common types of narrative employed are the inter-
related narratives of individual endeavour, national agendas and corporate com-
petition (Figure 1). Significant overlap is inevitable, with many of the most in-
teresting stories lying in the space between at least two of these narrative areas. 
There follows a few short examples of each of these narratives.
Narratives of Individual Endeavour—colourful characters
The history of the earliest days of computing is littered with colourful stories of 
lone inventors, toiling away in workshops, investing time and effort into at-
tempts to solve seemingly intractable problems. It has to be said, though, that 
often these accounts concentrate on the failures rather than successes…
The earliest of these inventors, the English mathematician Charles Babbage, 
predates the electronic computer by some way. He started developing a mechan-
ical calculator in 1821 at the behest of the British government who financed his 
work in the interest of national advantage. He worked determinedly for fifty 
years on designs for his ‘Difference Engine’ and its successor, the ‘Analytical 
Engine’, spending all of the money awarded to him constantly refining and re-
designing the machine without producing a working version. Although he nev-
er completed its construction, his work was widely disseminated through lec-
tures and inspired numerous others and his reputation as the father of the 
modern computer was assured when nearly 150 years after his design for the 
Difference Engine was completed, a fully working version was assembled from 
his plans (Atkinson, 2013).
As the computer industry grew, so did the number of colourful characters 
involved. Much later in the electronic computer’s history, Sir Clive Sinclair used 
cutting-edge research to push technological boundaries, and offered products 
for sale by mail order before they existed. He then used the money from these 
sales to try to develop the products (not always successfully). He attracted nu-
merous government grants, which he used to try and develop a miniature tele-
vision, but after his first few versions flopped, the funding was withdrawn. He 
Fig. 1 The interrelated narrative themes of Individual Endeavour; 
Corporate Competition and National Agendas.
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later launched numerous successful products 
including some of the earliest and best-selling 
low-cost home computers, the Sinclair ZX80, 
ZX81 and ZX Spectrum, and the ground- 
breaking but ultimately unsuccessful QL com-
puter in 1984, before selling his computer 
business. Things went spectacularly awry 
with his widely ridiculed one-man, bat-
tery-driven vehicle, the Sinclair C5. His new 
company went from product launch into re-
ceivership in just seven months (Atkinson, 
2013).
Perhaps to date the most famous individu-
al associated with the computer industry is 
the late Steve Jobs. Famously teaming with 
the talented technologist Steve Wozniak, Ste-
ve Jobs was the visionary businessman who 
saw the potential of the personal computer 
revolution, changing the device from a piece 
of arcane technology into an ‘information ap-
pliance’. An explosive character determined 
to get his own way no matter who he upset, he 
was finally ousted by his own executive board 
in 1985, only to return in 1997, when the com-
pany had completely lost its way and was fac-
ing a dire financial future. From there he 
built the company back up to the position it is 
in today, according to the various biographies, 
by sheer force of will. The personal battles be-
tween Steve Jobs and, in particular, Bill Gates, 
are well documented, and have now formed 
part of popular culture—the battles between 
the old, grey, outdated technology of Micro-
soft and the futuristic, modernist white world 
of Apple being lampooned even in popular 
children’s films such as Despicable Me.
The personalities involved in these narra-
tives, and the human aspect they bring to the 
often impersonal or anonymous side of tech-
nological development are clearly valuable as-
sets in attracting an audience to visit muse-
ums of technology. The challenge here is to 
present the individuals and their often-enter-
taining activities in a way that inspires the 
audience without falling into out-dated De-
sign Historical modes of hero worship or cel-
ebratory canonisation.
Narratives of National Agendas—attempts to 
build a computer industry. At the point in time 
(around the mid–late 1940s) when huge ‘elec-
tronic brains’ filled whole rooms, took teams of 
people years to build and weeks to program to 
perform calculations, the idea that they would 
eventually become personally-owned ‘informa-
tion appliances’ was unthinkable. The huge 
costs involved in their development could only be made via significant government 
investment but the results were often eventually commercialized by private corpo-
rate concerns that used that investment to turn themselves into massively success-
ful businesses.
Corroborating the well-known proverb that ‘necessity is the mother of in-
vention’, the Second World War provided exactly the right impetus for the mil-
itary to develop (more or less simultaneously) the valve-based code-breaking 
computer ‘Colossus’ in the UK and the artillery firing table calculator ‘eniac’ 
in the US. The UK kept their work on computers secret because of its applica-
tion, whereas the Us’ breakthrough was publicly displayed and was front page 
news across the world. Consequently, the Us had a head start in establishing a 
commercial computer. The ordnance department that had financed the eniAc 
understandably wanted the technology for free, but the University of Pennsyl-
vania where it had been developed claimed they had patent rights. 
The inventors of eniac, University staff J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly, 
challenged the University’s position as they wanted to go into business to make 
commercial computers. The University backed down. Eckert and Mauchly 
raised the money to develop the military eniac machine into the commercial 
univac machine from the Us government, which wanted a domestic computer 
industry, and the Census Bureau, which desperately required the counting abil-
ity of computers. First sold in 1951, the univac achieved television celebrity 
status when it correctly predicted the outcome of the Presidential Election in 
1952 (although its original prediction was not believed and so not transmitted) 
(Atkinson, 2010).
Similar histories of government funding providing the technology for private 
business to make profit can be found across the world. Shortly following WWii, 
the government-owned National Physical Laboratory in the Uk funded a com-
puter development project and enlisted the help of Alan Turing (who had devel-
oped the code-breaking ‘Bombe’ that preceded the top-secret Colossus machine) 
to design it. Bureaucracy caused delays and Turing’s plans for the Automatic 
Computing Engine were never realised. He went instead to Manchester Univer-
sity to work on the ‘Manchester Baby’, the first stored-program computer. With 
funding from Ferranti, this prototype became 
the Ferranti Mark 1, the Uk’s first commercial 
computer in 1951 (Atkinson, 2010).
In a same vein, the Swedish government, 
keen to keep abreast of the burgeoning elec-
tronic industry after the War, had been plan-
ning to buy computers from America, and 
sent engineers to study there until it became 
clear that the Cold War was going to prevent 
the export of computers. Instead, the govern-
ment set up a public institution to develop its 
own computers, and in 1950, produced an 
electro-mechanical machine called ‘bark’, 
and by 1953 had used its knowledge of Ameri-
can computers to produce ‘besk’, which at the 
time was the fastest computer in the world. 
Licences were granted to industry to manufac-
ture copies of the besk machine, and before 
long a number of Scandinavian companies 
including saab and Facit were producing their 
own variations (Atkinson, 2013).
Each of the examples outlined here obvi-
ously have a strong national bias. Understand-
ably, different museums have handled their 
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country’s history in relation to the computer’s devel-
opment differently. The Computer History Museum 
in Mountain View, California1 pays great heed to the 
development of eniac; The National Museum of 
Computing at Bletchley Park, Milton Keynes2 stress-
es the development of the Colossus and the work of 
Alan Turing leading to the ‘Manchester Baby’, while 
the Datamuseet IT–ceum in Linköping, Sweden,3 is 
proud to present its archive on the besk machine. 
The problematic issue here is to legitimately place 
national achievement and the political situation that 
fostered them within a broader context of interna-
tional parallel developments.
Narratives of Corporate Competition—the rise and 
fall of ibm. Given their prominence as one of, if not 
the most successful company in the world, it would 
be understandable to think Apple owned the greatest 
market share of computers ever. In fact, in 2016, Ap-
ple’s share of the global pc market was estimated to 
be 7.4% (Fingas, 2016). Compare this with the fact 
that in the mid 1950s, ibm had produced 70% (yes, 
70%) of all computers that had ever been made in the 
world (Pugh and Aspray, 1996: 15). That gives you 
some idea of the dominance ibm held in the industry. 
Building on earlier success in producing mechanical 
tabulating machinery used for keeping business re-
cords, the company expanded rapidly when it em-
braced emerging computer technology after World 
War II. It was so successful at this that before long 
the computer industry consisted of the giant that was 
ibm, and a few, much smaller companies. This situa-
tion was often referred to in computer industry me-
dia as ‘ibm and the seven dwarves’, the seven dwarves 
being Burroughs, univac, ncr, Control Data Corpo-
ration, Honeywell, General Electric and rca (clearly 
a very Us-led narrative). The history of the electronic 
computer throughout the 1960s and 1970s is conse-
quently more often than not presented as a case of 
ibm leading the way globally, with competition strug-
gling to make inroads into their dominance at vari-
ous points through means of technological innova-
tion.
The story of how ibm fell from this position pro-
vides an abject lesson to all companies on the dan-
gers of complacency. Convinced that there was no 
market for home computers, the management con-
tinually rebuffed the proposals to develop small per-
sonal computers from their own research and devel-
opment teams. When in 1977 three game-changing 
products appeared on the market in the form of the 
Commodore PET 2001, the Tandy TRS–80 and the 
Apple II, the market for home computers expanded exponentially and 
ibm were left with no product to compete. An attempt was made to devel-
op a very advanced personal computer called ‘Aquarius’ that had a num-
ber of revolutionary features including a prototype solid-state memory 
and solid-state cartridges of dedicated software packages, but manage-
ment considered the new technologies involved too risky and the project 
was shelved.
By this time, the only way to get a product to market quickly enough 
was to circumvent the company’s usual lengthy product development 
route and create a design that used mainly third party components and 
software developed by outside suppliers. This meant that when it was 
launched, the ibm pc was a very easy design for competitors to copy and 
make their own ‘clones’, which they did in their millions. The only part 
that couldn’t be copied was the operating system, and that was sold 
only by Microsoft. ibm never recovered from the impact of that decision 
(Atkinson, 2013).
In a similar vein to the narratives of national agendas, there is the 
problem here of presenting a balanced overview. It is only to be expected 
that corporate museums and archives such as those at the Sony and 
Fujitsu headquarters in Tokyo, or the Philips Museum in Eindhoven, 
will almost without exception deal only with the company’s own prod-
ucts (often presented in isolation, with little if any reference to a wider 
context). Independent museums, however, sometimes concentrate on 
the histories of national corporations at the expense of documenting 
international competition.
Back to the Future
Outside of these three interrelated narratives lies arguably the most im-
portant narrative of all: that of the reception of computing technology by 
the general public. It is perhaps the most difficult narrative of all to 
present, but it is important in that it provides valuable insight into the 
public perception and reception of computers. The future hopes and 
fears of society are implicitly reflected in the design of every generation 
of computer hardware and the promotional and instructional material 
that accompanied them. This is difficult to portray because such a nar-
rative relies on a level of analysis and interpretation, but the ephemera 
that surrounds the physical object of the computer—the newspaper and 
magazine articles, television programmes, promotional films, instruc-
tion manuals and advertising brochures—paint a fascinating picture of 
the fluctuating perception of computers in the mind of the public. Anal-
ysis of this ephemera shows that the reception of computing technology 
can be framed within two contemporary binary opposites. Admiration 
and hope formed the basis of a Utopian discourse; while fear and pessi-
mism formed the basis of a Dystopian discourse (Figure 2).
[1] See http://www.computerhistory.org/ 
[2] See http://www.tnmoc.org/ 
[3] See http://www.datamuseet.se/english/
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Fig. 2 ‘Traditional’ narrative themes within the contexts of utopian and dystopian representation and 
consumption.
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Utopia
One phenomenon that accompanied the 
introduction of the electronic computer 
was a utopian vision of how it could po-
tentially alter everyday life for the better. 
In the early 1930s the influential econo-
mist, John Maynard Keynes, believed 
that society would benefit from further 
developments in technology, and that 
our standard of life would improve at an 
ever-increasing rate. He predicted that 
within the space of one century, (i.e. by 
2030) mankind would have solved ‘the 
economic problem’ he had been facing 
for all of his existence—the struggle for 
subsistence—and be confronted with an 
entirely new problem of how to occupy 
the increased leisure time technology 
would afford (Keynes, 1931). This be-
came a prevalent idea. Popular culture 
from the 1950s onward was awash with 
ideas of a healthier, wealthier society en-
abled by computers. Technology was go-
ing to make life much more enjoyable by 
giving us an excess of free time. In the 
office, computers would do a week’s pa-
perwork in minutes. In the home, com-
puters would control the living environ-
ment and take care of all the housework. 
By freeing users from the drudgery of 
everyday chores, we would have more 
time to spend with our families and 
friends and to enjoy life.
How computer technology would 
prove of benefit in the workplace was fair-
ly straightforward to predict. For exam-
ple, ‘leo’, was the first electronic comput-
er designed specifically for business 
applications. Its makers, J. Lyons & Co., 
were a household name in food retailing. 
The company financed the development 
of a computer at the University of Cam-
bridge in 1949 and then adapted it to cre-
ate the Lyons Electronic Office (leo) Mark 
1, able to calculate the ingredients for the 
following night’s production of goods, 
plan their delivery and handle invoicing, 
accounts and payroll functions. They saw 
the computer would radicalize many 
mundane clerical office tasks. Business 
would see massive increases in produc-
tivity and efficiency, allowing costs to be 
cut and profits to be maximised.
In the running of the home, where so 
many of the tasks performed everyday 
were routinely physical ones rather than 
administrative ones, the role and bene-
fits of the computer were more difficult 
to pinpoint, yet it was also the arena in 
which computers promised to most di-
rectly affect our day-to-day existence. 
Many of these Utopian predictions cen-
tred on bringing the automation found 
in the factory into the domestic space. 
Fred McNabb’s illustrations were exam-
ples of predictions for future homes that 
featured automated conveyor belt cook-
ery, digitally controlled dishwashing 
and labour-free laundering. The gap be-
tween the automated factory and the la-
bour-saving house was presented as be-
ing very small indeed.
Dystopia
Of course, alongside these wistful imag-
inings of a computer-aided life of leisure 
ran more fearful concerns about the im-
pact of automation on our society. Popu-
lar media took every opportunity to 
point out potential pitfalls of future. 
Witness the Hanna–Barbera cartoon se-
ries The Jetsons of the early 1960s which 
showed push-button automatic meal 
makers producing the wrong food, 
sending a pizza flying across the room 
or producing uncooked frozen food be-
fore exploding.
Technical developments were evi-
dently easier to predict than social ones. 
In the case of The Jetsons, it might have 
been possibly because social changes 
would be difficult to explain in a cartoon, 
or because the comic effect arises from 
putting the unusual (the new technolo-
gy) in a familiar (the traditional social) 
setting. In The Jetsons, the nuclear family 
with a working husband and stay at 
home housewife was the norm, and 
there was never any blurring of the 
boundary between the workplace and the 
home responsible for so many extra 
working hours today. The lack of fore-
sight regarding social change has been, 
though, a major flaw in futurism and 
one that has diminished its reputation 
significantly. As Samuel Lawrence ob-
served, ‘The bias towards predicting 
technological versus social progress has 
been and continues to be the Achilles’ 
heel of futurism, the next wave of gadgets 
and gizmos easier to see coming than a 
cultural tsunami’ (Samuel, 2009: 6).
Having said this, fears of social 
change have long been part of the rep-
resentation of computing technology. 
Harrowing headlines accompanied arti-
cles about the first ‘Mechanical Brains’, 
declaring the end of civilization, and 
when ‘Electronic Brains’ started to ap-
pear commercially, one article warned 
that these machines gave one man the 
computing ability of 25,000 mathemati-
cians. This kind of worrying statistic, 
pointing to the thousands of jobs that 
could potentially be made redundant, 
has been a recurring theme, and shows 
no signs of abating: witness the constant 
stream of stories in the media today 
around the potential forthcoming im-
pact of Artificial Intelligence. The hopes 
of salvation embodied in futuristic tech-
nologies have always carried such a ca-
veat with them—a fear that we may be-
come the victims of the very technologies 
we create.
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Conclusions
The complex, interwoven history of the electronic computer is clearly so expan-
sive, and can be legitimately viewed from so many different perspectives, that 
any museum of technics and technology would find it impossible to cover every 
aspect. It is quite possible for a number of different narratives to be presented 
concurrently, but a holistic overview of these narratives would not be feasible. 
For this reason, inevitable bias appears. Firstly, museums’ collections are bound 
to be dominated by local and national material that has been specifically sourced 
or donated. Secondly, obviously, each museum has to appeal to its audience 
which will inevitably be dominated by local/national people. While an American 
institution foregrounding the history of the American pioneers behind eniac, 
or a British institution celebrating the work of Alan Turing is not only under-
standable, but financially necessary; making the audience appreciate the global 
situation surrounding that history and the very real connections that existed 
between them is equally important. Similarly, portraying the history of national 
corporations is equally understandable (especially when, for example, ibm had 
the kind of dominance in the marketplace discussed), but outlining the interna-
tional economic and political situations that afforded such dominance (as well 
as the events that led to such a swift demise) deserves far more exposure.
Explaining the presentation to and reception of computers by the general 
public presents a more difficult issue to resolve. That electronic computers are 
now such a dominant feature of our everyday life, so ubiquitous that they often 
disappear beneath our cognitive radars, trying to explain how they appeared to 
and were perceived by people when they were new, alien artefacts, runs the 
danger of being seen as a merely a source of amusement. For example, at one 
point, it was a commonly held view in the industry that the role the computer 
would perform would not extend beyond calculating mathematical functions, 
and so the applications would be of relevance only to scientific and business 
communities. The statements made about how much computing power would 
be required in the future seem laughably low today (measured in kilobytes, not 
terabytes), when even home computers regularly manipulate huge image files. 
When it later became apparent that the applications could in fact be much wider 
and used across different areas of business, computers were still horrendously 
complex and expensive pieces of equipment. It made logical sense, therefore, to 
have single centralised machines, with numerous people accessing them from 
geographically dispersed offices (universities being a good example). This was 
achieved via ‘dumb’ terminals that had no computing power of their own. When 
the idea of a computer in the home was first mooted, it was extrapolated that this 
operating model would be retained and that remote terminals would appear in 
a domestic setting. Without an understanding of these changes, presenting im-
ages of such domestic terminals could be interpreted as misguided or mis-
judged attempts to predict computer usage without appreciating how fast com-
puters would develop (where in fact, it has been common knowledge since the 
early sixties exactly how fast computers would develop after the publication of 
Moore’s Law, predicting that computers would double in power and halve in size 
every two years).
Design History as a discipline, then, has an important role to play in ensur-
ing these widely different perspective lenses are used to analyse the complex 
and nuanced history of the computer, and that the focus of analysis considers 
not only the technological development of the object, but the wider social con-
struction, representation and consumption of the computer within society.
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